Churchill and the Norway Campaign, 1940 by Graham Rhys-Jones

Author:Graham Rhys-Jones [Rhys-Jones, Graham]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War II, Europe, Great Britain, General
ISBN: 9781844689293
Google: _gXMDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Casemate Publishers
Published: 2008-10-30T00:28:18+00:00

Chapter 9

Painful Decisions and a Parliamentary Occasion

The Chiefs of Staff met to consider Churchill's call for the revival of ‘Hammer’ during the evening of 25 April. It was a ‘damnable’ meeting according to Ironside at which Churchill tried (quite improperly) to push the Chiefs towards an affirmative answer. With the southern front in disarray and disturbing news of German progress in the Østerdal, a coup de main against Trondheim had seemed the only alternative to a humiliating retreat, but the arguments that had turned staff opinion against ‘Hammer’ six days earlier remained as valid as ever. In their report to the MCC the Chiefs of Staff advised that the operation would take ten days to mount and that it would be impossible to make Trondheim safe against the scale of air attack that the Germans would bring against it. Once these propositions were accepted, the way ahead became clear. Troop withdrawals from France could be stopped, central Norway could be evacuated, and the capture of Narvik (the primary object all along) could be pursued ‘with all the speed and energy possible’. The Prime Minister (still chairing the MCC) was worried about the effect of withdrawal on neutral opinion and on the Government's standing at home, and had wanted to present the evacuation as part of a deliberate plan to concentrate effort in the far north. It was agreed that no date would be set for the operation and that evacuation would be postponed as long as possible – preferably until after the capture of Narvik.1

Cabinet members were uneasy when presented with these proposals but Chamberlain had taken care in recent days to keep his colleagues abreast of the situation and criticism was muted. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wanted to hold Namsos as an ‘outpost for Narvik’ and Sir John Simon, the Chancellor, argued that the abandonment of central Norway was inconsistent with undertakings given at the SWC only four days previously. There was logic in his arguments for the French were furious at this new example of British backsliding. Alerted (by Ironside) that big decisions were in the offing, General Maurice Gamelin (the French military Supremo) flew to London at the behest of the Comité de Guerre to argue the case that Trondheim should be taken ‘coûte que coûte’. That evening (26 April) he attended a special session of the War Cabinet. Churchill explained the Government's dilemma, stressing in particular the effects of German air action and the strain on naval resources. The situation, he said, had profoundly altered since the meeting of the SWC and was now ‘very grave’. HMG had reviewed the case for a direct attack on Trondheim but had rejected the idea after very careful consideration. Plans for Narvik remained unaffected and this had always been the ‘primary strategic objective’. In reply, Gamelin argued the case for maintaining a bridgehead in the mountains near Åndalsnes (a job tailor-made for his Alpine troops) and pointed out that the defence of Narvik began in central Norway.

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